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Introduction
Today, electronic commerce needs no
introduction. The speed of the development of
on-line applications and the acceptance of
electronic transactions coincided with the
extraordinary expansion and widespread
accessibility of the internet. However, this in turn
poses new challenges to legal systems. With a
view to addressing uncertainties over the
application of existing laws to transactions in the
electronic environment, Singapore introduced the
Electronic Transactions Bill2 in Parliament on 1
June 1998, and on 10 July 1998, the Electronic
Transactions Act (ETA) was enacted into law.3 The
Hong Kong experience is similar: the Hong Kong
government introduced its bill before the
Legislative Council on 14 July 1999,4 and by 5
January 2000, the Electronic Transactions
Ordinance (ETO)5 became law. The fast passage
of these laws before the Singapore and Hong
Kong legislatures was clearly motivated by the
determination of these legislatures to rapidly
establish legal regimes in these two jurisdictions
so that the development of electronic commerce
could be facilitated.6
Both the ETA and the ETO share the same parentage:
the Utah Digital Signature Act 1995 (Utah Act),7 the
world’s first digital signature legislation, and the Model
Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 (Model Law) adopted
by United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law.8 Both laws have been instrumental in the
development of electronic commerce legislation
worldwide, and in this regard, Singapore and Hong
Kong are pioneers in the enactment of electronic
commerce legislation. However, just as technology
continues to make its inexorable progress, legal
developments have also proceeded apace at the
international level. On 23 November 2005, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the new UN
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Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts (UNCITRAL Convention),9 and on
6 July 2006, China and Singapore became signatories to
the UNCITRAL Convention.10 With the pressing need for
the harmonization of national electronic commerce
legislation, particularly with the advent of the UNCITRAL
Convention, it is suggested that a review of the Singapore
ETA and the Hong Kong ETO is now a matter of some
urgency.11 Any such review will also enable a careful
consideration of the new issues brought about through
the advent of new electronic transaction models.
This paper seeks to undertake such a preliminary
review. The focus of the paper is on five broad areas: the
scope of electronic transactions and their exclusions,
the continued relevance of party autonomy, excluded
matters under electronic transactions legislation, the
tension between digital signatures and other forms of
electronic signature, the relevance of public key
infrastructure, and the management of new (and
unresolved) issues in electronic transactions.
Scope of electronic transactions 
The utility of any legislation lies in first demarcating the
scope of its application. Both the ETA and ETO do not
define what constitutes an ‘electronic transaction’ or
even ‘electronic commerce’, and only defines an
‘electronic record’ as ‘a record generated … [by] an
information system’.12 On the other hand, the UNCITRAL
Convention uses the term ‘electronic communications’,13
which is defined as an electronic ‘[communication in the
form of ] any statement, declaration, demand, notice or
request, including an offer and the acceptance of an
offer, that the parties are required to make or choose to
make in connection with the formation or performance
of a contract.’14 After defining what constitutes an
electronic transaction or an electronic communication,
the functional equivalence rules that equate electronic
transactions or communications with their traditional
counterparts, then follow. So electronic records are to
be equated with writing,15 electronic signatures with
handwritten signatures16 and electronic records
equated with physical records for presentation or
retention of information.17
If these ‘functional equivalence’ rules appear to have
direct application to contracts, this can be confirmed by
referring to the genesis of the UNCITRAL Model Law and
UNCITRAL Convention. The UNCITRAL instruments are
intended to apply only to ‘commercial activities’18 or
‘the use of electronic communications in connection
with the formation or performance of a contract
between parties.’19 The reach of the ETA and ETO are
much wider. In addition to dealing with contracting
parties, the ETA and ETO may apply to non-contractual
matters such as matters arising in property law,
industrial action, transport and carriage of goods,
agency, intellectual property, competition law and
claims in tort and delict. The ‘functional equivalence’
rules in the ETA and ETO may apply to these matters.
For instance, if a person forwards an e-mail with
defamatory content, by section 7 of the ETA and section
5 of the ETO, the e-mail as an electronic record satisfies
the legal requirement of ‘writing’ and constitutes libel
rather than slander in defamation law. If a company
signs an instrument of transfer of shares in the company
with a digital signature, by section 8 of the ETA and
section 6 of the ETO, a digital signature amounts to a
valid certification by the company and constitutes a
legal representation by the company that documents of
title to the shares have been produced by the transferor
to the company.20
Electronic government21
In addition, both the ETA and ETO contain provisions
dealing with the enablement and promotion of
9 UN Press Release, General Assembly Adopts New
Convention On Use Of Electronic Communications
In International Contracting GA/10424 L/3099 (23
November 2005), available on-line at http://www.
un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10424.doc.htm.
10 UN Press Release, China, Singapore, Sri Lanka
sign UN Convention on Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts
L/T/4396 (6 July 2006), available on-line at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/lt4396.
doc.htm.
11 The Information Technology and Broadcasting
Bureau (ITBB) of Hong Kong conducted a review of
the ETO in 2002, available on-line at
http://www.ogcio.gov.hk/eng/eto/download/ETOre
view-Consultation(E)03.pdf, but it appears no such
review has been conducted after China became a
signatory to the UNCITRAL Convention. Similarly, a
review predating the UNCITRAL Convention was
conducted by the Singapore Infocommunications
Development Authority in 2004, available on-line
at http://www.ida.gov.sg/doc/Policies%20and
%20Regulation/Policies_and_Regulation_Level2/I
DA-AGC_electronic_contracting_issues/ETA_
Review_-_An_Overview.pdf.
12 ETO, s 2(1) (electronic record); ETA, s 2 (electronic
record).
13 UNCITRAL Convention, Article 1.
14 Article 4(a) (communication).
15 ETA, ss 6, 7; ETO, s 5; UNCITRAL Convention,
Articles 8, 9(2).
16 ETA, s 8; ETO, s 6; UNCITRAL Convention, Article 9(3).
17 ETA, s 9; ETO, ss 7, 8; UNCITRAL Convention,
Article 9(4).
18 UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, Article 1, at 3.
19 Article 1(1).
20 Singapore Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed), s
129; Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, s 69A.
21 In Singapore, under the three-year e-Government
Action Plan II (eGAPII) launched in 2003, e-
services have been provided to citizens and
businesses, and a new S$2 billion five-year
masterplan, called iGov2010, has been developed
to guide Singapore’s latest direction in e-
Government: Infocommunications Development
Authority of Singapore, S$2 Billion Masterplan on
Integrating Government (30 May 2006), available
on-line at http://www.ida.gov.sg/News%20 and%
20Events/20050704121154.aspx?getPagetype=20;
Infocommunications Development Authority of
Singapore, 2006 Report on Singapore e-Government,
available on-line at http://www.igov. gov.sg/NR/
rdonlyres/0D5EE595-4D44-4B02-948C-07FB18239313
/0/2006ReportonSporeeGov.pdf. As for Hong
Kong, developing electronic government is one of
the five Key Result Areas (KRA) of the Information
Technology Plan called ‘2001 Digital 21 Strategy –
Hong Kong: Connecting the World’ promulgated
in May 2001 by the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region government: Electronic
Government in Hong Kong, available on-line at
http://www.ibls.com/ibls-internet-law-
doc.aspx?d=1489.
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electronic governance through government use of
electronic records, electronic signatures, electronic filing
and service of documents.22 However the approaches
taken are very different. The ETA takes an inclusionary
approach. Part XI of the ETA empowers any Singapore
government department, ministry, organ of state or
statutory corporation to accept electronic filings, issue
electronic licences and make payments in electronic
form.23 Where it so elects,24 each department, ministry,
organ of state or statutory corporation may make rules
or specify conditions for these purposes.25 Because the
ETA does not prescribe the form in which these rules or
conditions may take, each department has taken a
different approach to the implementation of electronic
government, and it can sometimes be difficult to locate
the relevant rules.26
On the other hand, the ETO takes an exclusionary
approach. Section 11 of the ETO empowers the
Permanent Secretary to make regulations to exclude an
Ordinance or a particular requirement or permission in
the Ordinance or such a class of requirements or
permissions from the ambit of the ‘functional
equivalence’ rules in Part III of the ETO.27 In this regard,
the Electronic Transactions (Exclusion) Order was
issued, which specifies in detail the various provisions
and regulations in the Ordinances to which the ETO
rules in relation to electronic writings, electronic
signatures, electronic presentations and electronic
records that do not apply.28 A perusal of the Schedules
to the (Exclusion) Order shows that the exclusions exist
in relation to four general classes: election matters;
matters relating to public property and infrastructure
such as land, buildings, roads and railways; registration
matters pertaining to marriages, births and deaths and
matters relating to public health and safety such as food
businesses, swimming pools, slaughterhouses, public
cemeteries, lifts and medicines. The policy decision has
been taken that any implementation via electronic
governance of these matters is undesirable or
unnecessary for reasons of administration or policy. This
has the effect of introducing a degree of certainty as to
the areas that electronic governance does not apply.
The provisions in the ETO enabling the use of digitally
signed government documents also promote the
acceptance of electronic records and communications in
the Hong Kong administration.29 Regarding the scope
and content of the administrative rules for the
implementation of electronic governance, it is good to
note that on 23 February 2007, the Hong Kong
government published a Gazette Notice describing the
manner and format of electronic records and
transactions under the ETO that are acceptable for the
different government departments.30 By prescribing the
acceptable standards and formats for electronic records
and transactions, the Hong Kong government has
greatly increased the transparency of its electronic
government rules and also enhanced the
interoperability and accessibility of its electronic
government processes with both the private sector as
well as with its citizens and residents.
Party autonomy
The principle of party autonomy underlies the rights and
obligations of parties to a contractual relationship. Party
autonomy is rightly the cornerstone of the UNCITRAL
Model Law31 and the UNCITRAL Convention.32 However,
as explained above, the ETA and ETO have application
beyond the contractual context. Electronic
communications outside the contractual context will
have legal force and effect independent of consensus
and the autonomy between parties to decide on their
rights and obligations between themselves. These
contexts may additionally initiate issues of public and
social policy for which party autonomy has little
relevance. This understanding is important when
considering whether to adapt existing national
22 For instance, see Electronic Transactions Bill,
Explanatory Statement; ETO, s 5A (service of
documents).
23 ETA, s 47.
24 ETA, s 47(3) confirms that no department, ministry,
organ of state or statutory corporation is required
to accept or issue any document in the form of
electronic records.
25 ETA, s 47(2).
26 For instance, see Immigration and Checkpoints
Authority, Submission of Application for Visa
Electronically (SAVE), available on-line at
https://www.psi.gov.sg/NASApp/tmf/TMFServlet?a
pp=SAVE-OVAL&isNew=true&Reload=true;
Applying for Entry Visa: Common Questions – What
are the requirements for the photograph image and
file attachment? available on-line at
http://www.ica.gov.sg/VETS/eservice_package/site/
faq_social.html#two, and application for
Permanent Residence, available on-line at
http://app.ica.gov.sg/serv_pr/per_res/app_for_pr.a
sp.
27 ETO, ss 5 (requirements for writing), 6 (electronic
signatures, digital signatures etc.), 7 (presentation
or retention of information in its original form) and
8 (retention of information in electronic records).
28 Electronic Transactions (Exclusion) Order, Chapter
553B.
29 ETO, s 6(1A).
30 G.N. 1270, available on-line at
http://www.ogcio.gov.hk/eng/eto/download/egn20
0711081270.pdf.
31 UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, at 31
paragraphs 44-45; UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment
2001, at 33 paragraphs 67, 111-112, 114 (UNCITRAL
E-Signatures Model Law).
32 UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on
Electronic Commerce on the work of its 44th
session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/571 (8 Nov 2004), at 19
paragraph 76, available on-line at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&JN=V0458992
(UNCITRAL WG Report). See Charles H. Martin.
‘The UNCITRAL Electronic Contracts Convention:
Will It Be Used or Avoided?’ Pace International Law
Review XVII.II (2005): 261-300, at 275-276, 289-
290, available on-line at http://works.bepress.com
/charles_martin/3 and UNCITRAL, Report of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law on the work of its thirty-eighth session, Annex
1, U.N. Doc. A/60/17 (July 26, 2005), at 8 paragraph
33, available on-line at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/a60d17_en.pdf.
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electronic transaction legislation to the UNCITRAL
convention provisions. As such, statements that ‘many
of the rules in the [UNCITRAL] Convention are equally
capable of application to domestic transactions, and
even to non-contractual situations’33 and ‘most of the
Convention rules are capable of application to non-
contractual transactions as well’34 require close scrutiny.
Unfortunately, the inclusionary approach to electronic
government in the ETA seems to encourage such a carte
blanche view, whereas the approach taken in the ETO
seems more measured and studied.
It is in this context that the provisions in the ETA,35
UNCITRAL Model Law36 and UNCITRAL Convention37
granting the parties autonomy from the provisions
themselves – that is, the power to exclude the
application of the provisions or derogate from or vary
their effect – should be understood. The latter two
international instruments deal exclusively with
contractual matters that create rights and obligations
between the parties, and UNCITRAL instruments such as
the United Nations Sales Convention generally have a
provision that recognizes party autonomy.38 To the
extent that the UNCITRAL instruments only deal with
rules that ‘provide functional equivalence in order to
meet general form requirements’,39 there is no
objection to recognizing party autonomy fully. However,
where mandatory and policy rules apply, there should
be little, if any, room for the parties to derogate from
these rules.40
It can be argued that the approach adopted in section
5 of the ETA – where party autonomy is ostensibly
confined to the functional equivalence rules (as to
contractual form) in Parts II and IV of the ETA41 – seeks
to preserve the mandatory rules in the ETA from party
autonomy. But this approach is not without difficulties.
First, this approach can lead to some measure of
dissociation. The other parts of the ETA, in particular,
Parts V to X, deal with the recognition of secure
electronic records and digital signatures (and the
setting up of a public key infrastructure necessary to
make them work). Since party autonomy also implies
the rights of the parties to vary the rules in the ETA,42 it
is questionable whether parties can expressly derogate
from these rules by way of contract. As digital
signatures and secure electronic records are species of
electronic signatures and electronic records, and parties
may, by contract, prescribe their own rules giving
recognition to some or particular types of electronic
records and electronic signatures, arguably, section 5 of
the ETA empowers parties to disregard, by way of
contract, almost all the substantive provisions in the
legislation itself.43 This would clearly include the
operative mandatory rules in the other Parts of the ETA
(such as duties upon subscribers and certification
authorities), a result that could hardly be intended by
Parliament.44 But reconciling party autonomy with the
mandatory rules in the ETA can be achieved by explicitly
identifying in the ETA certain rules as mandatory rules
that cannot be overridden by party autonomy.
Second, and more importantly, not all the rules in
Parts II and IV deal only with requirements as to form.
For instance, the attribution rule in section 13 of the ETA
(based on Article 13 of the Model Law) creates rules that
not only deem a message as coming from an originator
if it was sent by the originator, by the originator’s agent
or by an information system programmed by or on
behalf of the originator (section 13(1) and (2)), it would
also entitle an addressee ‘to regard an electronic record
as being that of the originator and to act on that
assumption’ if certain other conditions are satisfied.45
The first set of rules clearly comprises rules as to
agency, but the second set of rules deviate from agency
rules. This is clearly not a rule as to form. Thus, the
UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law observes that an
addressee is entitled to act on a data message after
applying an agreed authentication procedure, even if it
knew that the data message was not that of the
originator.46 But an originator is entitled to disavow a
33 Chong Kah Wei and Joyce Chao Suling, ‘UN 
Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts – A
New Global Standard’ (2006) 18 SAcLJ 116, 134,
available on-line at http://www.sal.org.sg/
digitallibrary/Lists/SAL%20Journal/DispForm.aspx
?ID=390 (subscription required).
34 Chong Kah Wei and Joyce Chao Suling, ‘UN
Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts – A
New Global Standard’ at 146.
35 ETA, s 5.
36 UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, Article 4.
37 UNCITRAL Convention, Article 3.
38 UNCITRAL WG Report, at 19 paragraph 74.
39 UNCITRAL WG Report, at 19 paragraph 76.
40 Daniel Seng and Yeo Tiong Min, Joint IDA-AGC
Review of the Electronic Transactions Act – Stage
III: Remaining Issues – Submissions (17 August
2005), at 5-13 (discussing the correct approach
towards the blanket exemption of network service
providers from mandatory rules), available on-line
at http://www.ida.gov.sg/doc/Policies
%20and%20Regulation/Policies_and_Regulation
_Level2/joint_review/ETA_Stage3_Law_Faculty_N
US.pdf.
41 ETA, s 5.
42 Chong Kah Wei and Joyce Chao Suling, ‘UN
Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts – A
New Global Standard’ at 158.
43 Jeffrey Chan Wah Teck, ‘Legal Issues In E-
Commerce And Electronic Contracting: The
Singapore Position’, 8th Asian Law Association
General Assembly 2003 (Workshop V Paper IV),
available on-line at available at
http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/docs/w5_sin
g.pdf, where the learned author offered the
opinion at page 242 that, ‘Parties to a contract
are therefore at liberty to agree as between
themselves to apply rules other than those set out
in the ETA to determine their contractual
intentions. This principle is repeated in many
provisions in Part III of the ETA where the phrase
‘Unless otherwise agreed by the parties’
frequently appears. [See sections 11(1), 15(1),
15(2), 15(4)].’
44 Singapore Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed).
45 ETA, s 13(3), (4) and (5); UNCITRAL E-Commerce
Model Law, Article 13(3), (4) and (5).
46 UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, at 51
paragraph 89. 
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message once it was sent,47 if the addressee knew or
should have known, ‘that the transmission resulted in
any error in the data message as received’.48 The
treatment of this issue is clearly confusing, because
issues as to the rights of parties between themselves
are interceded with the corresponding interests in
property, particularly rights of third parties arising from
subcontracts or chain contracts. Commentaries to the
UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law seem to take the
view that Article 13 is substantive in nature (the
Australian Report of the E-Commerce Expert Group to
the Attorney General calls it a section that sets out ‘risk
allocation rules’ that ‘presumptively [allocate] the risk of
loss arising from unauthorised or altered messages to
the apparent originator rather than the addressee.’).49
Yet the UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law starts its
commentary to Article 13 with the assertion that ‘the
purpose of article 13 is not to assign responsibility.’50 It
is noteworthy that countries such as Hong Kong have
avoided the mess created by the second set of
attribution rules based on Article 13 of the Model Law
by simply not having these rules at all.51 Unfortunately,
Singapore did not.
Parties can and do have the autonomy to allocate
risks themselves. However, the issue of risk allocation is
one that entails different issues in different contexts. In
the banking sector, where there may be established
legislation or industry codes that presumptively allocate
risks as between banks and customers,52 to cede these
carefully allocated risk allocation rules to parties under
the rubric of ‘party autonomy’ may do more to harm the
industry than the confidence in the industry that these
existing rules have built up. The industry rules that
operate in the context of different types of electronic
transactions have to be observed, notwithstanding the
party autonomy philosophy that is sought to be
captured in the UNCITRAL instruments.53 Perhaps, for
the reason that the attribution rule is both a rule as to
form and a substantive rule as to responsibility,
references to such a rule have been dropped in the
UNCITRAL Convention.54
In contrast, the Hong Kong ETO adopts a different
approach. Notably, the ETO does not have a general
party autonomy provision.55 In fact, the converse
philosophy seems to prevail: where party autonomy will
effect the operation of an Ordinance that has a
particular requirement or permission as to traditional
documents and records, the Ordinance generally
prevails. Reference has been previously made to the
Electronic Transactions (Exclusion) Order, enacted to
exclude Ordinances or a class of documents from the
operation of the functional equivalence rules. Court
proceedings and judicial processes are likewise
excluded, unless electronic documents and delivery are
specifically enabled by rules of court and procedures.56
And so are Ordinances that contain specific
prescriptions for electronic records and signatures.57
Where the Ordinance presumably does not fall into one
of the earlier rules, the catch-all rule in section 15
provides that where an Ordinance requires or permits
information to be given or a document to be served or
presented, the person to whom the information is to be
given or the person to whom the document is to be
served or presented has to first give consent.58 All these
are clear attempts at preserving the mandatory policies
behind Ordinances that prescribe traditional forms of
information delivery (and at the point of their
enactment, do not envisage electronic delivery). Of
course, this in turn implies that consent must be
individually sought, and sought in a piecemeal fashion,
for a waiver by the recipient of his rights to traditional
forms of information delivery under the Ordinances.
Excluded matters 
Yet another class of matters exist which are completely
excluded from the ambit of electronic transactions
legislation. The approach here is that reliance cannot be
made in certain categories of matters on the electronic
transactions legislation, in particular, the functional
rules, for the requirements of form such as writing,
documents, signatures and records to be satisfied.59
Various reasons have been offered for their exclusion,
47 UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, at 51
paragraph 90.
48 ETA, s 13(6); UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law,
Article 13(5).
49 Report of the Electronic Commerce Experts Group
to the Attorney-General, at paragraphs 2.13.10.
and 4.1.13.
50 UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, at 49
paragraph 83.
51 ETO, s 18.
52 For instance, see the Australian Electronic Funds
Transfer Code of Conduct, Clause 5 (unauthorised
transactions) and Clause 6 (system or equipment
malfunction); Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
Supervisory Policy Manual: Supervision of E-
banking paragraph 5.1.2 (February 17, 2004) and
HKMA Code of Banking Practice (December 2001),
paragraph 40.1.
53 UNCITRAL WG Report, at 19 paragraph 73.
54 Chong Kah Wei and Joyce Chao Suling, ‘UN
Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts – A
New Global Standard’ at 139-140, explained, with
reference to the UNCITRAL Working Group reports,
that the reason for not having the rule was a lack
of international consensus on the rule of
attribution.
55 ETO, s 17(1), which reads, ‘For the avoidance of
doubt, it is declared that in the context of the
formation of contracts, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, an offer and acceptance of an offer
may in whole or in part be expressed by means of
an electronic record.’ However, this is not a
general party autonomy provision – it only relates
to contract formation.
56 ETO, s 13.
57 ETO, s 14.
58 ETO, s 15(1), (2), (2A) and (4).
59 IDA and AGC, Joint IDA-AGC Review of the
Electronic Transactions Act - Stage II: Exclusions
from ETA under Section 4 (June 2004), available
on-line at http://www.agc.gov.sg/publications/
docs/ETA_StageII_Exclusions_Section_4_2004.pdf
, at 12 paragraph 2.1.3 (Joint IDA-AGC Review:
Stage II).
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with the primary reason being that electronic records
and signatures are not yet a perfect substitute for
physical documents.60 Other reasons that are offered
include the existence of detailed rules, including the
need to observe certain formalities governing these
matters, the absence of appropriate technology and
processes to replace traditional processes for dealing
with these matters, and the likelihood of technological
obsolescence, especially where documents will be
needed for a long time.61
In this regard, it would be wrong to conclude that
because the UNCITRAL instruments have very narrow
exclusions – in particular, the UNCITRAL Convention
does not apply to contracts concluded for personal
purposes, regulated transactions such as exchange
transactions, banking, foreign exchange and payment
systems, and transfer of security rights and documents
of title and carriage, the ETA and ETO should also be
widely applicable and the exclusions should be
narrowly confined.62 Again, to reiterate, the ambit of the
ETA and ETO is not confined to agreements by
consensus. If this reasoning were correct, there would
be no reason why, for instance, the UNCITRAL
Convention failed to exclude wills and trusts as personal
instruments, and mortgages and charges as commercial
instruments from its ambit.
Both the ETA and ETO exclude almost the same
classes of matters from the application of the electronic
transactions rules, as the following table illustrates:
Singapore Electronic Transactions Act63 Hong Kong Electronic Transactions Ordinance64
Creation or execution of a will
Creation, execution, variation, revocation, revival or rectification of a will,
codicil or any other testamentary document
Negotiable instruments Negotiable instruments
Creation, performance or enforcement of an
indenture, declaration of trust or power of attorney
with the exception of constructive and resulting
trusts
Creation, execution, variation or revocation of a trust (other than resulting,
implied or constructive trusts), a power of attorney
Contracts for the sale or other disposition of
immovable property, or any interest in such
property
Assignment, mortgage or legal charge within the meaning of the
Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap 219) or any other contract
relating to or effecting the disposition of immovable property or an interest in
immovable property
Conveyance of immovable property or transfer of
any interest in immovable property
Deed, conveyance or other document or instrument in writing, judgments,
and lis pendens referred to in the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap 128) by
which any parcels of ground tenements or premises in Hong Kong may be
affected
Document effecting a floating charge referred to in section 2A of the Land
Registration Ordinance (Cap 128)
Documents of title Making, execution or making and execution of any instrument which is
required to be stamped or endorsed under the Stamp Duty Ordinance (Cap
117) other than a contract note to which an agreement under section 5A of
that Ordinance relates
Government conditions of grant and Government leases
Oaths and affidavits
Statutory declarations
Judgments (in addition to those referred to in section 6) or orders of court
A warrant issued by a court or a magistrate
60 Second Reading of the Electronic Transactions 
Bill 1998, Singapore Parliamentary Debates,
Official Report (29 June 1998) volume 69 at
column 254.
61 Joint IDA-AGC Review: Stage II, at 14 paragraph
2.2.2.
62 Chong Kah Wei and Joyce Chao Suling, ‘UN
Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts – A
New Global Standard’ at 152, paragraph 89.
63 ETA, s 4.
64 ETO, s 3 read with Schedule 1.
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Table 1: Comparing the Excluded Matters in the Singapore ETA and Hong Kong ETO
A comparison of the ETA and ETO suggests that more
care has gone into the ETO list of excluded subject
matter. In particular, mortgages and charges would not
fall within any of the excluded categories in the ETA, as
they are not, on the face of it, ‘contracts for the sale or
other disposition of immovable property or any interest
in such property’. Given the significance attached to
physical documents relating to or evidencing
transactions involving immovable property, this
‘omission’ in the ETA requires close examination.65
Conversely, it is interesting to note that the ETO does
not omit documents of title, in so far as these are not
deeds or instruments pertaining to land or government
grants of property. Given that documents of title and
documents of carriage are an inextricable part of
international commerce, the absence of any
international instruments regulating this area and the
similar exclusion of such documents from the UNCITRAL
Convention66 suggests at first sight that there is a lacuna
in the ETO. Perhaps this omission is with reference to
possible support in Hong Kong67 for projects such as the
Bolero scheme – an electronic bill of lading that serves
as a functional replacement for a conventional bill of
lading.68 However, the Bolero project exists
independently of electronic commerce legislation
because it operates by way of the Bolero Rule Book,
under which all the parties are contractually bound by
digital signatures and the electronic nature of Bolero
statements.69 Nevertheless, the recognition of an
electronic document of title does give credence and
support to an important project such as Bolero.70
Notwithstanding the exclusion of these matters from
the ambit of the ETA and ETO, it is of interest to discuss
whether these excluded matters or transactions can be
done or concluded electronically. This question was
answered in the affirmative by the Singapore High Court
in SM Integrated Transware Pte Ltd v Schenker
Singapore Pte Ltd.71 With reference to section 4(1)(d) of
the ETA, which excluded from its ambit ‘any contract for
the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or
any interest in such property’, Prakash J came to the
conclusion that Part II of the ETA, which gives legal
recognition to electronic writings and electronic
signatures, will not apply. However, Prakash J went on to
deal with the issue of whether, at common law, an e-
mail purportedly concluding a lease transaction can
satisfy the formality requirements for writing and
signature as required by the Singapore Civil Law Act.72
Her Honour came to the conclusion that it does. In
relation to the requirement of writing, the court said:
‘The aim of the Statute of Frauds was to help protect
people and their property against fraud and sharp
practice by legislating that certain types of contracts
could not be enforced unless there was written
evidence of their existence and their terms.
Recognising electronic correspondence as being
‘writing’ for the purpose of s 6(d) of the CLA, would
be entirely consonant with the aim of the CLA and its
predecessor, the Statute of Frauds, as long as the
existence of the writing can be proved.’73
This holding on the part of the court must be correct.
Common law courts have already recognised electronic
records as writings or documents,74 and there is no
reason why electronic records cannot also be writings
for purposes of the rules as to formalities.
The more difficult issue was that of whether an
electronic record can be signed electronically to satisfy
the formalities rules. On this issue, the court said:
‘I am satisfied that the common law does not require
handwritten signatures for the purpose of satisfying
the signature requirements of s 6(d) of the CLA. A
typewritten or printed form is sufficient. In my view,
no real distinction can be drawn between a
typewritten form and a signature that has been typed
onto an e-mail and forwarded with the e-mail to the
intended recipient of that message.’75
The court went on to hold that on the facts of the case,
even though the officer for the defendant did not
65 It is to be noted that there is currently in place in
Singapore a legal framework for the electronic
lodgment of instruments for land law
administration: Wong Peck, ‘New Era In
Conveyancing: Online Submission Using STARS
eLodgement System’, Law Gazette (September
2003), at 8, available on-line at
http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2003-9/index.htm.
66 UNCITRAL Convention, Article 2(2): ‘bills of
exchange, promissory notes, consignment notes,
bills of lading, warehouse receipts or any
transferable document or instrument that entitles
the bearer or beneficiary to claim the delivery of
goods or the payment of a sum of money’.
67 Bolero, Tradelink – KEB announcement: Bolero
partners with Tradelink to provide Hong Kong
exporters with first unified view of all their
outstanding Letter of Credit Advices, available on-
line at http://www.bolero.net/news/news
.html?article=NTAzNw==.
68 Bolero, Businesses set to benefit by US$ millions
as bolero.net goes live 27 September 1999,
available on-line at http://www.bolero.net/assets
/25/Businesses%20set%20to%20benefit%2027
%20Sept%20991091552724.pdf.
69 Bolero, Bolero Rulebook (September 1999),
available on-line at http://www.boleroassociation.
org/downloads/rulebook1.pdf. See also Bolero,
Legal Aspects of a Bolero Bill of Lading (9
November 1999), available on-line at
http://bolero.codecircus.co.uk/assets/31/legal%2
0aspects%20of%20a%20bill%20of%20lading1
092161487.pdf.
70 Though the Bolero Rule Book is governed by
English law, the Bolero Rulebook predates the
enactment of the UK Electronic Communications
Act 2000.
71 [2005] SGHC 58; [2005] 2 SLR 651.
72 Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed), s 6(1)(d).
73 [2005] SGHC at 80.
74 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 9) [1991] 1 WLR 652,
R v Governor of Brixton Prison and anor Ex Parte
Levin [1997] QB 65; [1996] 3 WLR 657, Megastar
Entertainment Pte Ltd v Odex Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR
91, Alliance Management SA v Pendleton Lane P
and Anor [2007] 4 SLR 343; [2007] SGHC 133.
75 [2005] SGHC at 91.
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appended his name to the bottom of his e-mail
message, all his e-mail messages had an originating
addressee line that read ‘From: ‘Tan Tian Tye’ tian-
tye.tan@schenker.com’. In the opinion of the court, this
was sufficient to constitute Tan Tian Tye’s signature
because ‘[t]here is no doubt that at the time he sent
them out, he intended the recipients of the various
messages to know that they had come from him’ and
that ‘his omission to type in his name was due to his
knowledge that his name appeared at the head of every
message next to his e-mail address so clearly that there
could be no doubt that he was intended to be identified
as the sender of such message.’76
The holding in SM Integrated Transware v Schenker
Singapore suggests that by virtue of the e-mail header,
which contains the e-mail addressing information, every
e-mail is ‘signed’ for purposes of meeting various
formalities requirements.77 A similar conclusion was
reached by a US court in International Casings Group
Inc v Premium Standard Farms Inc, where the court said
that a combination of the e-mail header with the name
of the sender coupled with the use of the ‘send’ button
represented the intention of the parties to authenticate
and adopt the contents of the e-mails as their own
writings, and that was enough to satisfy the
requirement of a ‘signature’.78 Likewise an Australian
court in McGuren v Simpson reached the same
conclusion.79 In contrast, the English High Court in J
Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta80 came to the opposite
conclusion, that the automatic insertion of an e-mail
address in the header is not intended for a signature
and that ‘its appearance divorced from the main body of
the text of the message emphasizes this to be so’,81 and
should not be considered as an e-mail guarantee signed
under s 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677.
A learned author has disagreed with this aspect of the
reasoning in Fernandes v Mehta, particularly as regards
the part noted above in quotes, rightly noting that an e-
mail header is part of the entire e-mail, and is not
disconnected or divorced from its main body of
contents.82 Cases interpreting the rules for formalities
for signatures in wills and rules in the Statute of Frauds
and Statute of Limitations confirm that it does not
matter where the signature is applied.83 In fact, the
same cases show courts connecting separate but
related documents to piece together a signed
memorandum of contract.84 The fact that e-mail readers
hide the e-mail header from most users would not make
it any less part of the e-mail itself.
Yet there are undoubtedly decisions that have not
gone so far, preferring to meet the statutory signature
requirement by finding electronic signatures in e-mail
footers.85 In this regard, the cases seem to be drawing a
distinction between the use of a signature to
authenticate the genuineness of the document and its
use to authenticate the genuineness of the addressee.86
A signature has to satisfy the former to meet the
formalities requirements. In Canton v Canton, Lord
Chelmsford in the House of Lords summarised the
jurisprudence on signatures in the Statute of Frauds as
follows:
‘The cases upon this point cited in the course of the
argument establish that the mere circumstance of the
name of a party being written by himself in the body
of a memorandum of agreement will not of itself
constitute a signature. It must be inserted in the
writing in such a manner as to have the effect of
“authenticating the instrument,” or “so as to govern
the whole agreement,” to use the words of Sir
William Grant, in the case of Ogilvie v Foljambe, or in
the language of Mr. Justice Coleridge, in Lobb v
Stanley, “so as to govern what follows.”’87
Lord Westbury likewise drew a similar distinction
between subscribing a name and having a ‘sufficient
signature’ to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.88 
This may explain the justification offered by the
76 [2005] SGHC at 92.
77 Lee Liat Yeang, ‘Validity Of Electronic Contracts
For Transaction Of Interests In Land’ Reporter,
Rodyk & Davidson, March 2006, at 4, available
on-line at
http://www.rodyk.com/publications/rodyk_reporte
r/mar06/index.php?page=property01, who
described the decision as ‘commercially correct’
but advised clients to always include in their e-
mail correspondence the phrase ‘subject to
contract’.
78 358 F Supp 2d 863 (W D Mo 2005).
79 [2004] NSWSC 35.
80 [2006] 1 WLR 1543; [2006] 2 All ER 891; [2006] 1 All
ER (Comm) 885; [2006] All ER (D) 264 (Apr);
[2006] IP & T 546; The Times 16 May 2006; [2006]
EWHC 813 (Ch).
81 [2006] 1 WLR 1543 at 1552.
82 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law
(Tottel, 2nd edn, 2007), 10.24. See also Stephen
Mason (ed), Electronic Evidence: Disclosure,
Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), 8.40.
83 For example, see Lemayne v Stanley (1797) 3 Lev.
1; 83 ER 545, Johnson v Dodgson (1837) 2 M. & W.
653; 150 ER 918, Holmes v Mackrell (1858) 3 C.B.
(N.S.) 789; 140 ER 953, The First National Bank of
Elgin v Husted 205 N.E.2d 780 (Ill.App.1965).
84 For example, see Saunderson v Jackson (1800) 2
Bos. & Pul. 238; 126 ER 1257, Allen v Bennet,
(1810) 3 Taunt. 169; 128 ER 67, Jackson v Lowe,
(1822) 1 Bing. 9; 130 ER 4, Johnson v Dodgson
(1837) 2 M. & W. 653; 150 ER 918.
85 Shattuck v Klotzbach 2001 WL 1839720; 14 Mass L
Rptr 360 (Mass Super, 2001), at 3.
86 The ETA, s 2, defines an ‘electronic signature’ as
one ‘executed or adopted with the intention of
authenticating or approving the electronic record’
to which it is attached or logically associated.
Unfortunately, the definition appears to conflate
the identification function of a signature with the
authentication function of a signature. These two
separate and distinct functions are more clearly
spelt out in the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, Article 7. See UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to
Enactment 1996, at 37-39. See also UNCITRAL E-
Signatures Model Law, at 54 paragraph 120.
87 (1867) LR 2 HL 127 at 139. 
88 (1867) LR 2 HL 127 at 142-143.
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courts favouring e-mail footers on the basis that they
express the sender’s intention to authenticate the
contents of the e-mail through his ‘deliberate choice to
type his name at the conclusion of all e-mails.’89 Many
of the Statute of Frauds and Statute of Limitations cases
can be explained on this basis, that the courts found an
unequivocal act in the form of handwriting applied by
the party as his acknowledgment of his intention to be
bound by the memorandum or promise.90 But the cases
also show that courts have found signatures in printed
address labels or headed notepaper embellished with
the party’s handwriting,91 or written correspondence
which starts off with the party’s name.92 The question is
whether these can be equated with an e-mail header,
which sets out the name of the originator of the e-mail.
From a technical perspective, as originally envisaged by
the late Dr Jonathan Postel, the architect of the e-mail
protocol, the ‘From:’ component in an e-mail header
serves an identification function to identify the sender
(or more accurately, the source mailbox of the sender).93
But that does not in itself exclude the possibility that it
may also serve a signature function. The party’s act in
applying or using the address labels and letterheads,
which originally serve to identify the originator of the
note or memorandum, may confer on these labels and
letterheads ‘the effect of giving authenticity to the
whole instrument’. Thus it has been submitted by a
learned author that the act of clicking on the ‘Send’
button for a properly addressed e-mail, in conjunction
with the ‘From’ line of an e-mail header that acts to
designate the sender, amounts to an act of
authentication of the entire e-mail and is capable of
satisfying the statutory signature requirement.94
On the other hand, it is common knowledge that
some e-mail client programs allow their users to
program the ‘From:’ field with whatever name that one
wishes to send e-mails. As another author noted, ‘many
people set up their e-mail clients to state their name
and e-mail address as part of the setup requirements …
and may not intend for such a feature to be used as
personal identification.’95 Presumably, the author also
implies that because of their informal usage, e-mails
and their headers do not meet the statutory signature
requirement.
Which approach is to be favoured may depend on an
assessment of the policies that lie behind the
formalities rules. In his seminal article, Professor Fuller
explained that legal formalities exist to serve three
important functions: an evidentiary function (to prove
the existence and purport of the document, in the case
of controversy), a cautionary function (to give a sense of
importance to the transaction and cause the party
transacting to take pause before entering into a legal
obligation) and a channelling role (to quickly and easily
distinguish the legal from the non-legal obligation).96
Increasingly, it seems that courts are more prepared to
resile from the broad approach as to signatures taken
by earlier courts,97 and are less prepared to erode the
formalities rules.98 In fact, echoing the cautionary and
channelling functions, courts today stress commercial
certainty by discouraging the use of extrinsic evidence
to establish a signature.99 While typing the name of the
signatory or setting up the system to automatically add
the name before sending an e-mail is capable of
indicating to the recipient that the signatory had the
necessary authenticating intention and is capable of
satisfying a statutory signature requirement,100 even the
Law Commission in the United Kingdom expressed
doubt as to whether that is enough to bring home to the
signatory the seriousness of the commitment he is
entering into, and to give the signatory the opportunity
for reflection before entering into the commitment.101
Ultimately, whether an e-mail is considered ‘signed’
because of its e-mail header, footer or from the
circumstances of its application is a question that
depends on whether the fact that ‘there the name being
generally found in a particular place by the common
usage of mankind … may very probably have the effect
of a legal signature, and extend to the whole [body of
the instrument]’.102 Bearing in mind that the formalities
rules serve as mechanical, non-substantive rules that
are designed to substitute for the difficult task of
89 Shattuck v Klotzbach, 2001 WL 1839720 at 3.
90 See the earliest case that decided this matter, 
Stokes v Moore (1786) 1 Cox 219; 29 ER 1137.
91 Saunderson v Jackson (1800) 2 Bos. & Pul. 238; 
126 ER 1257, Schneider v Norris (1814) 2 M & S 
237; 105 ER 388, Tourret v Cripps (1879) 48 LJ 
(Ch) 567; 27 WR 706.
92 Knight v Crockford (1794) 1 Esp. 190; 170 ER 324,
Lemayne v Stanley (1797) 3 Lev. 1; 83 ER 545, 
Lobb and Knight v Stanley (1844) 5 QB 574; 114 
ER 1366.
93 Jonathan B. Postel, RFC 821: Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (August 1982), at 3-4, in describing the
‘reverse-path’ that contains the source mailbox,
available on-line at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/ 
rfc0821.txt. The source mailbox also serves as the
reverse-path which can be used to report e-mail
transmission errors. It is also optional in some
circumstances.
94 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law
(Tottel, 2nd edn, 2007), 10.25.
95 Bryan Tan, Case Note – SM Integrated Transware
Pte Ltd v Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd, Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review,
(2005), 2, 112, 113.
96 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum.
L. Rev. 799, 800-802 (1941); Stephen Mason,
Electronic Signatures in Law (Tottel, 2nd edn,
2007), 1.20 – 1.26.
97 Hubert v Treherne (1842) 3 Man. & G. 743 at 755;
133 ER 1338 at 1342 per Maule J, Firstpost Homes
Ltd v Johnson and Ors [1995] 1 WLR 1567, 1575
per Peter Gibson J.
98 Caton v Caton (1867) LR 2 HL 127, at 144 per Lord
Westbury; Vista Developers Corp. v VFP Realty
LLC 2007 WL 2982259, 4-5 (N.Y.Sup., 2007).
99 Firstpost Homes Ltd v Johnson and Ors [1995] 1
WLR 1567, 1577 per Balcombe LJ.
100 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal
Requirements in Commercial Transactions (19
December 2001), at 14-15.
101 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal
Requirements in Commercial Transactions (19
December 2001), at 17 (in relation to wills) and 18
(in relation to guarantees).
102 Stokes v Moore (1786) 1 Cox 219 at 223; 29 ER
1137 at 1139 per Mr Baron Eyre.
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determining whether, for example, the testator intended
to execute the will, or the guarantor intended to make
an unconditional promise to pay,103 the correct question
to be asked is: will the ‘common usage of mankind very
probably’ accept that the use of an e-mail header or
footer constitutes a signature that gives authenticity to
the whole electronic will or guarantee?
The convenience offered by modern day e-mail clients
means that both e-mail headers and footers can be
automatically applied by the e-mail client program to
every outgoing e-mail.104 As regards the former, lay
users seem to set up their e-mail clients with their
names and the ‘From:’ e-mail addresses with little if any
regard for the full legal consequences of treating them
as ‘signatures’. And they make their formal and informal
communications from that same e-mail client without
regard for the difference between the two.105 E-mail
users in business environments who use e-mail for
official communications would appear to operate on the
converse assumption. The analogy can be made with
the use of printed letterheads by businesses as
substitutes for signatures.106 But current anecdotal
evidence regarding general e-mail usage suggests that
the fact that one wishes to be identified as the sender of
an e-mail does not necessarily imply that one wishes to
sign every e-mail, or to authenticate every e-mail with
the attendant legal consequences. Furthermore, courts
have looked at with some disfavour automatic
imprinting of names by machines as indicators of intent
to authenticate instruments, on the basis that they do
not demonstrate the sender’s specific intent to
authenticate that transmission.107 If users choose to use
e-mail for their correspondence, there are not too many
ways to avoid this consequence. Getting parties to
specify in every e-mail that the correspondence is
‘subject to contract’108 just seems too cumbersome. If it
could generally be said that e-mail headers are
techniques applied ‘with no clear intent by the signatory
of becoming legally bound by approval of the
information being electronically signed’,109 there will be
no approval of the signed record.110 However, in the
business environment, the presumptions may be
different. Whether or not there are any doubts if the
court in Integrated Transware v Schenker had applied
too low a standard to determine if the e-mail was signed
by basing it only on the e-mail header may turn on an
evaluation of the context of and the environment within
which the particular e-mail is used.111 A case-by-case
analysis may be required.112
On the other hand, appending an electronic footer to
the e-mail leads to a presumption that the signatory
had manifested his intention to authenticate this
transmission for purposes of the formalities rules.113 The
corollary can be made with the more modern cases on
formalities which approve of the use of stamps as
signatures where they are actively applied by the party
to the ‘signed’ document.114 Of course, some e-mail
clients also offer the convenience of automatic footers
for e-mails. But unlike e-mail headers, this is an
optional feature that can be disabled in e-mail clients.
Giving e-mail users the clear option to ‘sign’ their e-
mails through an electronic footer reinforces the
objective assessment of the sense of importance that
users may attach to particular e-mails, and assists in
the conclusion that the cautionary and channelling
functions of a signature for purposes of the formalities
rules have been met.
To sum up, the touchstone in these cases is in an
objective ascertainment of the intent of the signatory to
authenticate the instrument,115 with regards for the
policies behind the formalities rules. This would have
provided a more persuasive foundation for the decision
of the Singapore High Court in the case of Kim Eng
Securities Pte Ltd v Tan Suan Khee,116 decided
subsequent to Integrated Transware v Schenker. In this
case, the court found that a remisier had ‘signed’ his
103 Michael Hay, The E-Sign Act of 2000: The Triumph
of Function over Form in American Contract Law
76 Norte Dame L. Rev. 1183, 1204 (2001).
104 This is unlike the Statute of Frauds and Statute of
Limitations cases, where, as analysed above, the
signatures have to be actively applied through
writing and stamping.
105 The e-mail communication in McGuren v Simpson
[2004] NSWSC 35 was clearly informal in nature,
tenor and context but the court held that it was
enough to constitute an admission of legal
liability to the recipient.
106 Brydges (Town Clerk of Cheltenham) v Dix (1891)
7 TLR 215. But see Hucklesby v Hook (1900) 82 LT
117.
107 Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc. v Estate of
Short 87 N.Y.2d 524, 527; 663 N.E.2d 633, 634-
635l 640 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478-479 (N.Y.,1996). Cf.
Good Challenger Navegante SA v
Metalexportimport SA (The  ‘Good Challenger’)
[2003] EWCA Civ 1668, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67, at
paragraphs 25-26 for a discussion about whether
the ‘answerback’ response generated by a
facsimile machine is sufficient to constitute a
signature.
108 Lee Liat Yeang, ‘Validity Of Electronic Contracts
For Transaction Of Interests In Land’ Reporter,
Rodyk & Davidson, March 2006, at 4, available
on-line at http://www.rodyk.com/publications/
rodyk_reporter/mar06/index.php?page=property
01.
109 UNCITRAL E- Signatures Model Law, at 54
paragraph 120.
110 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law, at 54
paragraph 120.
111 For instance, in Integrated Transware v Schenker,
in the final e-mail in the chain of correspondence,
there was an assertion of authority by Mr Tan, the
general manager, over his lawyers as regards
some provisions in the draft contract. That
suggests an officious use of e-mail in which Mr
Tan clearly manifesting his intent to conclude the
lease. See [2005] 2 SLR 651 at [47].
112 Vista Developers Corp. v VFP Realty LLC 2007 WL
2982259, 3 (N.Y.Sup., 2007).
113 Rosenfeld v Zerneck 4 Misc.3d 193, 196; 776
N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (N.Y.Sup., 2004).
114 Tourret v Cripps (1879) 48 LJ (Ch) 567; 27 WR
706, Ex parte Dryden (1893) 14 NSWR 77,
Goodman v J Eban LD [1954] 1QB 550, British
Estate Investment Society Ltd v Jackson (HM
Inspector of Taxes) (1956) 37 TC 79
115 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce: Formal
Requirements in Commercial Transactions (19
December 2001), at 13.
116 [2007] 3 SLR 195.
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acknowledgment of debt in an e-mail to his principal,
who sued him on this e-mail, when he included his
name ‘Suan Khee’ at the end of the e-mail to affirm the
various contra losses of his clients.117 (The Singapore
Limitations Act requires that all formal
acknowledgments of debt be in writing and signed by
the person making the acknowledgment).118 However,
the court cited, as support for its reasoning, Integrated
Transware v Schenker, when it was clearly not directly
relevant, as the subject matter of the e-mail in question,
a contractual debt, did not fall within the list of excluded
subject matter. The court could have considered that the
legislative object of this formalities requirement119 was
to ensure that a person would only be bound by his
acknowledgment of debt where his signature is not
incidental but unambiguous,120 and was one that
objectively indicated his approval of the contents.121
Having regard for the functional equivalence rules in the
ETA,122 since the e-mail was written in response to a
legal request for repayment, the context of the e-mail
setting out his debts and the use of the remisier’s name
at the end clearly constituted an electronic signature
that authenticated the remisier’s acknowledgment and
also satisfied the formalities rule requiring signatures
for acknowledgments of debt. This would have been a
more satisfactory reasoning than an unqualified
application of Integrated Transware as an unqualified
rule of law.
Even where the functional equivalence rules in
electronic commerce legislation do not have direct
application to the excluded subject matter in applying
the various formalities rules to the digital environment,
the common law recognition of electronic records as
documents and electronic signatures as signatures may
still benefit from an assessment of what constitutes an
‘electronic record’ and an ‘electronic signature’ in the
ETA and ETO. To the extent that these definitions are
based on common law jurisprudence and capture the
functional essence of what constitutes a ‘record’ and a
‘signature’ for purposes of these policies, courts may
still find these definitions helpful and persuasive
(though not binding).123 Conversely, simply equating in a
mechanistic fashion all marks and identifiers as
‘signatures’ in the electronic environment without
considering the intent of the purported signatory and
the legislative object of the formalities rules may
actually hinder the certainty and predictability that
these rules were intended to bring to commercial
transactions.
Electronic records
Both the ETA and ETO have broadly the same definitions
of an ‘electronic record’ and also offer the same broad
acceptance of an electronic record as one ‘whose
informational content is usable for subsequent
reference in lieu of writing’.124 These provisions are
almost identical to Article 9(2) of the UNCITRAL
Convention and no changes seem necessary.
Electronic signatures vs digital signatures 
Both the ETA and ETO are unique in that they define
electronic signatures and digital signatures and
distinguish between them.125 On the other hand, the
UNCITRAL instruments do not expressly distinguish
between electronic signatures and digital signatures as
a species of electronic signatures. In fact, the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Signatures even goes so far as
to state that there has to be ‘equal treatment of
signature technologies’,126 arising in part because the
approach taken by the Working Group, which seemed to
place ‘excessive emphasis on digital signature
techniques … [and] third-party certification’ ‘did not
sufficiently reflect the business need for flexibility in the
use of electronic signatures and other authentication
techniques’.127 The emphasis on ‘technology neutrality’
is with a view to ensuring that legislation is ‘not to be
interpreted as discouraging the use of any method of
electronic signature, whether already existing or to be
implemented in the future.’128 Such technologies may
include biometrics,129 and the dynamics of handwritten
signatures, symmetric cryptography, the use of PINs,
tokens and other factors and even clicking on an ‘OK’
box.130 This ‘technology neutral’ stance looks set to be
increasingly popular.
Yet this does not, and should not, imply that national
legislation should be bereft of all and any policies and
117 [2007] 3 SLR 195 at paragraph 51.
118 Singapore Limitations Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev
Ed).
119 Section 27 of the Singapore Limitations Act is
derived from the English Limitation Act 1939, s
24, which is in turn derived from the English
Statute of Frauds (Amendment) Act 1828. The
language of s 27 is very similar to that used in
the Statute of Frauds 1677, s 4.
120 Mahtani and Sterling Bureau de Change Ltd v
Billington [2003] EWHC 3127 (QB), [2003] All ER
(D) 403.
121 Good Challenger Navegante SA v
Metalexportimport SA (The ‘Good Challenger’)
[2003] EWCA Civ 1668, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67 at
paragraph 22. Neither Mahtani nor The ‘Good
Challenger’ appear to have been cited to the
court.
122 ETA, s 8: ‘Where a rule of law requires a
signature, or provides for certain consequences if
a document is not signed, an electronic signature
satisfies that rule of law.’
123 Integrated Transware v Schenker [2005] 2 SLR
651 at paragraph 30.
124 ETA, ss 6, 7; ETO, s 5.
125 ETA, s 2; ETO, s 2.
126 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law, Article 3.
127 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law with Guide, at
13 paragraph 19.
128 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law with Guide, at
21 paragraph 34.
129 Stephen Mason (ed), Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility
(Butterworths, 2007), 8.43.
130 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law with Guide, at
38, at paragraph 82.
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guidance on various implementations of electronic
signatures. The UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law
advises that regulations be issued to fill in the
procedural details, and that these regulations should
also preserve the process of voluntary technical
standards setting, particularly with reference to open
standards that will facilitate interoperability and cross-
border recognition of electronic signatures.131 The E-
Signatures Model Law even acknowledges that a
distinction may have to be made between signatures
recognised as retrospectively valid by a trier of fact, and
signatures as prospectively valid by parties,
organizations or authorities for their purposes.132 This is
required to ensure certainty and predictability of
electronic signatures when commercial parties make
use of them, and not at the time when there is a dispute
before a court.133
Likewise, the UNCITRAL Convention, clearly drawing
upon the duality model as described above in article 6
of the E-Signatures Model Law, would equate an
electronic signature that identifies the party and
indicates that party’s intention in respect of the ‘signed’
electronic document with its non-electronic counterpart
if (a) a reliable method is used as is appropriate for the
purpose of the document to establish identity and
intention, or (b) the identity and intention are actually
proven in fact.134 So understood, a properly executed135
digital signature is, under the ETA, deemed to be a
‘secure digital signature’136 and it shall be presumed,
under article 9(3)(b)(i) of the UNCITRAL Convention, to
be the signature of the person to whom it correlates,
and to be affixed by that person with the intention of
signing or approving the electronic record.137 Likewise,
section 6 of the original 2000 version of the ETO would
equate a digital signature with a manuscript signature if
it is ‘supported by a recognised certificate and is
generated within the validity of that certificate’. Both
the ETA and the then ETO provide examples of ex-ante
legally recognised digital signatures as signatures.
However, this does not mean that electronic
signatures that are not digital signatures are not legally
recognised. Where section 8 of the ETA merely states
that an electronic signature satisfies a rule of law that
requires a signature, it states nothing about whether
that signature is a reliable signature. Section 8(2) goes
on to describe how electronic signatures may be reliable
– they may be proved ‘in any manner, including by
showing that a procedure existed by which it is
necessary for a party … to have executed … a security
procedure for the purpose of verifying that an electronic
record is that of such party.’ Although its language is
not as clear as that of article 9(3)(b) of the UNCITRAL
Convention, it is clear that proving an electronic
signature in section 8(2) here includes both proof by
procedure and proof in fact.138 So explained, section
8(2) may be reconciled with the regime for a ‘secure
electronic signature’ as prescribed in Part V of the ETA.
Admittedly, however, this is one provision whose
language can be improved with reference to the more
precise language in article 9(3) of the UNCITRAL
Convention and the functional language in article 6 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures.
In contrast, the original 2000 edition of the ETO only
recognised digital signatures as a valid signatures,
which gave rise to concerns that this is a technology-
specific approach139 that will limit the use of electronic
signatures. This was remedied by way of the Electronic
Transactions (Amendment) Ordinance 2004,140 which
deleted the original section 6 and replaced it with three
conditions:
the signatory uses a method to attach the electronic
signature to or logically associate the electronic
signature with an electronic record for the purpose of
identifying himself and indicating his authentication
or approval of the information contained in the
document in the form of the electronic record;
having regard to all the relevant circumstances, the
method used is reliable, and is appropriate, for the
purpose for which the information contained in the
document is communicated; and
the person to whom the signature is to be given
131 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law with Guide, at
34 paragraph 69.
132 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law with Guide,
Articles 6, 7; See also 35 paragraph 76.
133 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law with Guide, at
58 paragraphs 132-134.
134 UNCITRAL Convention, Article 9(3).
135 Executed in accordance with the requirement that
the digital signature be crated during the
operational period of a valid certificate and that
the certificate is trustworthy. ETA, s 20(a), (b).
136 ETA, s 20.
137 ETA, s 18(2).
138 Chong Kah Wei and Joyce Chao Suling, ‘UN
Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts – A
New Global Standard’ at 166, for the view that
article 9(3)(b)(ii) is ‘likely to swallow the original
rule in article 9(3)(b)(i). In our view, it is
inconceivable that an electronic signature could
be appropriately reliable within the meaning of
article 9(3)(b)(i), if it could not be proven in fact
to have fulfilled the functions of an electronic
signature as described in art 9(3)(a).’ It is
submitted that this is an erroneous reading of
article 9(3)(b) and fails to appreciate the
discussion and work that went into the drafting
of its predecessor provision, articles 6 and 7 of
the UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law.
139 Hong Kong Legislative Council Brief - Electronic
Transactions (Amendment) Bill 2003 (10 June
2003), ITBB/IT 107/41/1 (03) Pt. 29, at 2
paragraphs 4-5, available on-line at
http://www.ogcio.gov.hk/eng/eto/download/LCBr
ief.pdf.
140 No 14 of 2004.
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consents to the use of the method by the signatory.
The new section 6(1) is clearly an improvement over the
original section 6(1), because it accommodates
electronic signatures in general and digital signatures in
particular. However, the third condition – that the
person to whom the signature is to be given has to first
consent to the use of an electronic signature – seems
somewhat difficult to explain. This condition seems to
originate from the original section 15(3) of the 2000
edition of the ETO, wherein consent of the recipient is
required for the use of a digital signature where an
Ordinance requires the signature of the originating
signatory.141 The repeal in 2004 of section 15(3) seems
to have led to the transfer of this requirement – which,
as explained above, is a requirement that preserves the
mandatory rules in the Ordinances from party autonomy
– to section 6 instead. This condition will clearly lead to
practical difficulties in its implementation outside the
context of consensual agreements. For instance, if I
were to release my software into public domain, and I
wish to grant a worldwide licence to this effect, and
electronically sign my licence for this purpose, section
6(e) would require me to first seek the consent of the
recipient of my licence to my use of electronic
signatures. This is clearly infeasible!
Aside from the practical difficulties of meeting this
condition, it is respectfully submitted that this condition
can only be justified on the basis of public policy, and
not otherwise. Surely it is the prerogative (and
independent autonomy) of the signer to choose a
method for authenticating his document or message.
The mode of the signer’s signature is irrelevant to the
issue of whether the mode chosen can serve to
authenticate the signature as the signer’s or evidence
his intention. To transpose section 6 into the traditional
context, it is as if the law states that I may only sign my
document in red fountain ink on green paper if the
recipient of my document so consents. It is
questionable that the law should constrain the
expression of my identity and my intention. The only
possible explanation is that there may be difficulty in
discerning and validating such a signature. For instance,
it may be proportionately expensive, administratively
cumbersome or computationally complex to validate a
person’s digital signature.142 Hence if prior consent has
to be first sought from the recipient of the electronic
signature, this is clearly an issue of policy rather than of
form. But if the mode of signature is characterised as a
question of form rather than policy, autonomy should
properly be granted to the signer.
Public key infrastructure
One common characteristic of the ETA and ETO is the
detailed provisions in both legislations regarding the
duties of subscribers and certification authorities.143
Both the ETA and ETO adopt a voluntary licensing model
for certification authorities. Thus both legislations are
replete with provisions pertaining to the regulation of
licensed certification authorities.
There is much force in the observation that these are
matters that are best dealt with in subsidiary legislation
rather than in enabling primary legislation. In particular,
the rules should be described in functional rather than
in operational and technical terms,144 as this will best
enable the overseer of certification authorities to craft
suitable administrative and technical rules to deal with
these issues, and also to rapidly and easily revise these
rules to bring them in line with best international and
industry practices and standards. This is so especially
since public key infrastructure remains, as is any
internet technology, subject to security and
cryptographic challenges as to its reliability and
integrity.
New and unresolved issues in electronic
transactions 
The ETA and ETO are pioneering electronic transactions
legislations that paved the way for other national
legislations and a better understanding of e-commerce
issues. The rest of the ETA and ETO embody general
contractual rules as to form such as contract formation145
and ascertaining the time and place of dispatch and
receipt of messages.146 These rules are generally
uncontroversial.
However, in one respect, the issue of attribution of
messages to the originator remains a difficult one. As
explained above, the issue of attribution is a mixed
issue of form (‘Did the message come from the
originator?’) and substance (‘Am I entitled to act on the
message, assuming that it came from the originator?’).
This issue is not capable of easy resolution and the
UNCITRAL Convention has wisely left it to national
legislation to grapple with the issue. It is this author’s
submission that because this is an issue that depends
141 For example, see Hong Kong Legislative Council
Panel on IT & Broadcasting – Review of the
Electronic Transactions Ordinance (5 Nov 2002),
at 5 paragraph 12, and 6-7 paragraph 16(b).
142 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law
(Tottel, 2nd edn, 2007), 14.14 – 14.16; Wikipedia,
XML Signature, available on-line at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML_Signature.
143 ETA, Parts VII to X; ETO, Parts VI to XI.
144 UNCITRAL E-Signatures Model Law with Guide, at
14 paragraph 20.
145 ETA, s 11; ETO, s 17; UNCITRAL Convention, Article
11.
146 ETA, s 15; ETO, s 19; UNCITRAL Convention,
Article 10.
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on the content of the delivery of messages, it is best left
to specific legislation for individual treatment.
One new substantive issue which the UNCITRAL
Convention has sought to deal with is the issue of error
in electronic communications.147 This issue is not dealt
with in either the ETA or the ETO. It is in effect couched
as a rule of form that requires parties offering
automated messaging systems such as shopping web
fronts to provide natural persons, usually consumers,
the right to withdraw orders that they have made arising
from input errors. This rule is clearly to be welcomed,
particularly where it seeks to standardize electronic
commerce practices by vendors, and presents
consumers with a uniform and non-contentious way to
withdraw from transactions which they would not have
otherwise entered into had they known of the input
mistake. It also avoids the difficult and intractable case
law in the area of unilateral mistake (as applied to
consumers making mistakes), which often leaves
contracting parties in a greater state of uncertainty.148
After all, parties offering automated messaging systems
are better placed to design systems that will minimise
input errors made by their customers, and this will
further build greater confidence in their business
systems. The enactment of this provision is highly
recommended for the ETA and ETO.
Conclusions
As this short review shows, there is work ahead for both
Singapore and Hong Kong in the area of electronic
transactions legislation. The recently concluded
UNCITRAL Electronic Contracting Convention offers a
good reason and justification for a review of existing
legislation. There is a need to keep up with
technological developments, particularly with the
greater acceptance of other forms of electronic
signatures. There is today a better understanding of the
functions of electronic records and electronic
signatures, and a deeper appreciation of the interaction
between electronic transaction rules and mandatory
rules, through greater social and consumer acceptance
and use of electronic technologies and electronic
government. And with greater usage comes issues of
risk such as input mistakes that are peculiar to the
electronic environment. All these issues have to be dealt
with. 
Singapore and Hong Kong are pioneers in the area of
electronic transactions legislation. But being pioneers
does not mean that there should be no further reform in
our laws. In an area as dynamic as information
technology, one can do not better than to quote from
Issac Asimov, who said, ‘The only constant is change,
continuing change, inevitable change, that is the
dominant factor in society today. No sensible decision
can be made any longer without taking into account not
only the world as it is, but the world as it will be.’149 So
it is only apt that our electronic transactions legislations
be changed, to keep up with the ever changing
information technology landscape.
© Daniel Seng, 2008
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